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STATE OVERSIGHT OF NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: 
CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE OF MISSION ADHERENCE 
WITHIN A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL STANDARD 
Mark S. Blodgett,* Linda J. Melconian,** and Jason H. Peterson*** 
“Donors generally do not expect to receive benefits from their 
donations, but they do anticipate their funds will be used to support the 
mission [adherence] of the organization.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit governance is a national concern because these ubiquitous 
organizations comprise a significant part of the U.S. economy and 
workforce.2 For example, in 2010, approximately 1.6 million nonprofits 
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1 Danné L. Johnson, Seeking Meaningful Nonprofit Reform in a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World, 54 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187, 193 (2009). 
2 NONPROFITS BY THE NUMBERS, http://www.councilofnonprofits.org/telling-our-story/ 
nonprofits-numbers (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). Perhaps a unique aspect of American society as 
commented by Alex de Tocqueville, “Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of 
dispositions . . . are forever forming associations” necessary for a democratic form of government where 
“all citizens are equally independent and cannot rely on a powerful central government to dictate values 
or dispense charity.” 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 129 (Cambridge: Sever & 
Francis 1863) (1840). See also AMY S. BLACKWOOD ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN 
BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING, 2012, at 2 tbl.1 (2012). See also Mark S. 
Blodgett, Linda J. Melconian & Jason H. Peterson, Evolving Corporate Governance Standards for 
Healthcare Nonprofits: Is Board of Director Compensation a Breach of Fiduciary Duty?, 7 BROOKLYN 
J. CORP. FIN. COM. L. 443, 444 (2013) (discussing prevalence of nonprofit associations). 
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were registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as public charitable 
organizations exempt from taxes; forty percent reported assets totaling 
$4.49 trillion.3 Today, President and Fellows of Harvard College, the 
nation’s largest public nonprofit charity, report assets of nearly $60 billion.4 
Human services, healthcare and education are the three largest 
categories of nonprofit organizations, representing 34.0%, 12.1% and 
18.2% respectively of the total nonprofit sector.5 Additionally, foundations, 
community centers, churches and religious orders, veteran and fraternal 
organizations, and private golf clubs are among those nonprofits that 
qualify for tax-exemption.6 Their total impact on the U.S. economy is 
significant: approximately a 24% growth rate for nonprofits in the last 10 
years; a growth rate that surpasses the growth rate of both business and 
government; an impact which contributes $804.8 billion or 5.5% of 
National Gross Domestic Product.7 Their paid and volunteer workers 
comprise more than 10% of the total workforce.8 Such economic impact 
requires responsible nonprofit governance committed to the adherence of 
the nonprofit mission.9 
This article proposes that nonprofit governance includes three 
dimensions and that states confront the challenge of mission adherence 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 See BLACKWOOD ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (detailing break down of nonprofits in United 
States); see also Johnson, supra note 1, at 194; Elizabeth T. Boris, Erwin de Leon, Katie L. Roeger & 
Milena Nikolova, National Study of Nonprofit-Government Contracting: State Profiles, URBAN 
INSTITUTE (Sept. 2009); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). For example, health care nonprofits 
include 60% of community hospitals, all community health centers, nearly 30% of nursing homes, 
approximately 17% of home health care agencies, and 40% of all private health insurance enrollees. See 
also AMY S. BLACKWOOD ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, NONPROFIT ALMANAC, 2012 (2012). 
4 See Largest Organizations (NCCS, Core 2011 Public Charities File), National Center for 
Charitable Statistics, URBAN INSTITUTE (2011), http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/showTopOrgs 
.php?cat=ALL&amt=ass_eoy. 
5 See BLACKWOOD ET AL., supra note 2, at 4; see also Strengthening Transparency, Governance, 
Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector, 
PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 11 (June 2005) (graphically demonstrating “Breakdown of 
Charitable Organizations by Mission”). 
6 See BLACKWOOD ET AL., supra note 2, at tbl.1.1, at 4–5 (noting expansiveness of tax-exempt 
organizations listed in Internal Revenue Code); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012) (listing categories of tax-
exempt organizations). 
7 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
8 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 195. 
9 EVELYN BRODY, THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 476 (Lester Salamon ed., Brookings 
Institution Press 2002) (discussing importance of adhering to donor direction and mission). 
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within this multi-dimensional standard.10 This suggested standard must 
include the often overlooked and unregulated adherence to mission.11 It 
must also include the highly visible public and scholarly considerations of 
fiduciary leadership and financial integrity.12 The importance of financial 
integrity for nonprofits is indisputable since a nonprofit Board of Directors 
must govern by conserving and properly managing the organization’s 
assets.13 Furthermore, a nonprofit Board maintains a consistent fiduciary 
responsibility to govern the organization in a manner that accomplishes its 
mission and state oversight should complement this responsibility.14 Thus, a 
multi-dimensional standard sets the tone for enhanced collaboration 
between State Attorneys General and nonprofit leadership. 
The essence of any public charitable nonprofit organization is the 
mission statement, which fully identifies and develops its values, purpose 
and goals.15 Once the Articles of Incorporation are filed in the state where 
the nonprofit is incorporated, it can seek a tax-exempt benefit from the 
IRS.16 This benefit presumes an ethical obligation of public trust since the 
public taxpayer bears the burden of nonprofit support.17 Consequently, 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 Gary Kirk & Shabnam Beth Nolan, Nonprofit Mission Statement Focus and Financial 
Performance, 20 NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP 473, 477–78 (2010) (“Most authors agree 
that nonprofit organizational performance is multi-dimensional, but there is no accepted standard of 
effectiveness [for accomplishing mission]).” 
11 See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
12 See Kirk & Nolan, supra note 10, at 477–78 (discussing multidimensional approach to 
nonprofit governance). 
13 See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice: 
Guide for Charities and Foundations, INDEPENDENT SECTOR (Oct. 2007), http://www.nacua.org/ 
documents/GoodGovernance.pdf (discussing legal compliance, governance, financial oversight and 
fundraising in nonprofit organizational context). 
14 See id. 
15 R. Duane Ireland & Michael A. Hitt, Mission Statements: Importance, Challenge, and 
Recommendations for Development, 35 BUS. HORIZONS 34, 34 (1992) (discussing importance of 
mission statement as guiding principle for nonprofits); Kirk & Nolan, supra note 10, at 477–78; Ralph 
Hader, More than Words: Providing a Clear and Concise Mission Statement, 37 NURSING MGMT. 6, 6 
(July 2006) (noting importance of dedication to mission statement). 
16 I.R.C. § 501 (2006); see also National Council of Nonprofits—“How to Start a Nonprofit,” 
http://www.councilofnonprofits.org/resources/how-start-nonprofit (listing five general steps regarding 
how to start a nonprofit organization). 
17 Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final 
Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector, PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 9, http:// 
www.indepdentsector.org/uploads/Accountability_Documents/Panel_Final_Report.pdf (June 2005) 
(highlighting public trust as important factor to success of nonprofit organizations). See generally Arthur 
W. Page Society, The Dynamic of Public Trust in Business—Emerging Opportunities for Leaders: A 
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society demands that nonprofits fulfill their unique purpose and historic 
mission, an essential part of their governance.18 
The authors investigated state application of a multi-dimensional 
standard of nonprofit governance in twelve states with the largest numbers 
of public charitable nonprofit corporations: California, Florida, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.19 A review of State Attorneys General 
websites and nonprofit statutes in each of these states helps to ascertain 
state oversight of nonprofit governance.20 State Attorneys General in six of 
the twelve states—California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Texas—have a separate Charities or Nonprofit Division 
with limited staffing to carry out their regulatory responsibilities of 
oversight, accountability and enforcement as well as monitoring nonprofit 
initiatives.21 Moreover, state guidance of nonprofits varies from state to 
state.22 Most significantly, this regulatory review demonstrates no 
                                                                                                                           
 
Call to Overcome the Present Crisis of Trust in Business, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR 
CORPORATE ETHICS 6 (2009), http://www.corporate-ethics.org/pdf/public_trust _in_business.pdf 
(discussing importance of trust in businesses generally). As this special report makes clear, “public trust 
in business” is not only a concern for nonprofit organizations, but rather stretches across all businesses. 
See id. 
18 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
19 See Table 1. 
20 See, e.g., State Dep’t of Justice, California Office of the Attorney General, http://oag.ca.gov/ 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2014); State Dep’t of Justice, Florida Office of the Attorney General, http:// 
myfloridalegal.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2014); State Dep’t of Justice, Illinois Office of the Attorney 
General, http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
21 See Office of the Attorney Gen., Services and Information: Charities, CAL. STATE DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://oag.ca.gov/charities (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); The Nonprofit Organizations/Public 
Charities Division, ATTORNEY GEN. OF MASS., http://www.mass.gov/ago/bureaus/business-and-
labor/the-nonprofit-organizations-public-charities-division/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); State of Mich., 
Consumer Protection: Charities, ATTORNEY GEN. BILL SCHUETTE, http://www.michigan.gov/ag/ 
0,4534,7-164-17337_18095---,00.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Services for Charities, MIKE 
DEWINE: OHIO ATTORNEY GEN., http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Business/Services-for-Charities 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Charitable Trusts and Organizations Section, PA. ATTORNEY GEN., http:// 
www.attorneygeneral.gov/consumers.aspx?id=227 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Charities and 
Nonprofits: Registration and Filings, ATTORNEY GEN. OF TEX. GREG ABBOTT, https://www.oag.state 
.tx.us/consumer/nonprofits.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Charities and Nonprofits]. 
22 See supra note 21 (citing to states’ charities divisions). For example, California, Ohio and 
Pennsylvania all have links to nonprofits handbooks that help guide the organization. See generally 
Office of Attorney Gen., Handbook for Charitable Nonprofit Organizations, COMMW. OF PA. (Nov. 
2011), http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/uploadedFiles/Consumers/nonprofitbooklet.pdf; Edmund G. 
Brown, Jr., California Attorney General’s Guide for Charities, ATTORNEY GEN. STATE OF CAL. (2005), 
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recognition or identification of mission adherence, today’s most pressing 
nonprofit governance challenge.23 
This article concludes by proposing a multi-dimensional standard of 
governance which confronts the challenge of mission adherence. State 
Attorneys General through their National Association of State Attorneys 
General (the National Association) should work with other nonprofit 
leadership to articulate, enable, and monitor this standard.24 Furthermore, 
they must collaborate with members of the National Council of Nonprofits 
to guide nonprofit governance.25 This collaboration should propose a “State 
Nonprofit Best Practices” initiative to advance a multi-dimensional 
standard of governance that adequately addresses the challenge of mission 
adherence.26 The best practices should include the development of mission 
adherence criteria and a mechanism for communicating the nonprofits’ 
satisfaction of the criteria to the stakeholder community.27 
                                                                                                                           
 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/guide_for_charities.pdf?; Charitable 
Law Section, Handbook for Nonprofits: An Operational Resource for Members of Charitable 
Organizations, OHIO ATTORNEY GEN. MIKE DEWINE’S OFFICE, http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/ 
OhioAttorneyGeneral/files/4e/4ebbc2fe-b053-427e-8730-de6cbd0244ff.pdf. Massachusetts, Florida, and 
Texas, on the other hand, merely provide general guidelines for nonprofit organizations regarding 
registration, filing, taxes, etc. 
23 See Table 2a. 
24 See KEVIN P. KEARNS, THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 589 (Lester Salamon ed., 
Brookings Institution Press, 2d ed. 2002) (noting importance of measureable standard). 
25 See Find Your State Association, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, http://www 
.councilofnonprofits.org/find-your-sa (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (listing all states with an individual 
state Association of Nonprofits). It may also include such organizations as the National Association of 
Nonprofit Accountants and Consultants, a national affiliation of independently owned accounting firms 
who assist nonprofits to improve their governance. Welcome to NPAC, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
NONPROFIT ACCOUNTANTS AND CONSULTANTS, http://www.nonprofitcpas.com/public/default.asp (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
26 See supra notes 12 and 15 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing importance of transparency); see also 
KEARNS, supra note 24, at 589 (discussing dimensions of accountability on behalf of nonprofits). “All 
stakeholders must embrace the oversight system that accurately tracks compliance or performance 
relative to the standard as well as reporting procedures that capture the relevant information and convey 
it in a timely manner to the overseeing authority.” Id. See also BRODY, supra note 9, at 488 (noting 
movement towards public disclosure on behalf of nonprofits). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Nonprofits: A Unique History 
Nonprofit corporations possess distinctive qualities, benefits and 
obligations, and derive their formation, governance and organizational 
existence from three historic roots.28 First, the tax-exempt benefit, based on 
their legal formation and purpose, dates back to sixteen and seventeen 
century Acts of the British Parliament which granted a tax-exempt status to 
certain health and educational institutions whose mission benefited the 
public good.29 To receive this tax benefit today, charitable nonprofit 
organizations must commit in their legal formation to faithfully carry out a 
specific, charitable public purpose.30 Additionally, they must commit their 
profits to this public purpose rather than distribute net earnings to those 
who control the organization.31 
Secondly, our tradition of nonprofit governance is one that is largely 
autonomous from government control as provided by founding charters of 
colonial America.32 An early example is the establishment of Harvard 
                                                                                                                           
 
28 See infra notes 29–38 and accompanying text (discussing history of nonprofit corporations). 
29 See Paul Arnsberger, Melissa Ludlum, Margaret Riley & Mark Stanton, A History of the Tax-
Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 105 (Winter 2008), see Peter Dobkin 
Hall, A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and Nonprofit Organizations in 
the United States 1600–2000, at 32, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (W.W. 
Powell & R. Steinberg eds., Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2006) (focusing on history of nonprofit 
organizations in United States). Hospitals have long been tax exempt as provided by the 1597 Charitable 
Corporations Act. Id. Shortly thereafter, the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses expanded such charitable 
scope for “maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers, schools of learning, free schools and scholars in 
universities.” Id. See also Blodgett et al., supra note 2, at 444. 
30 See Arnsberger supra note 29, at 106 (noting requirement that “charitable organizations operate 
for charitable purposes”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (including “[c]orporations . . . 
organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes”). This requirement dates back to the 
Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, one of the earliest acts to reference the tax-exempt status of 
nonprofit, charitable organizations. 
31 Pamela C. Smith & Kelly A. Richmond, Call for Greater Accountability Within the U.S. 
Nonprofit Sector, 11 ACAD. ACC. & FIN. STUD. J. 75 (2007) (discussing prohibition against distributing 
profits to individuals in control of organization). 
32 See Peter D. Hall, A History of Nonprofit Boards in the United States, BOARDSOURCE 3 (2003), 
http://beech.ait.fredonia.edu/nfp/ReadingRoom/PDFs/BoardSource-AHistoryOfNonprofitBoardsInThe  
UnitedStates.pdf (last visited July 10, 2013) (discussing Massachusetts Bay Company’s charter). See 
also Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events: A 
Consideration of Black Life Under American Law From 1619 to 1972 and a Challenge to Prevailing 
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College.33 In 1650, the Massachusetts colonial legislature initiated 
governance practices for nonprofits by granting Harvard an independent 
charter of incorporation with a specific mission to promote the public 
good.34 Thus, Harvard developed a distinct governance framework 
promoting Board autonomy within the auspices of the colonial legislature’s 
regulatory oversight.35 From this colonial tradition states inherited the 
primary responsibility to exercise regulatory authority over nonprofit 
governance.36 
Lastly, a nonprofit’s right to exist originates in the U.S. Constitution 
where the First Amendment’s Right to Assemble implicitly allows for this 
large and powerful area of organizational activity.37 Therefore, nonprofit 
charitable organizations, committed to serving public needs, maintain a 
unique and favored status in the United States for four reasons: first, 
adherence to their charitable public mission and purpose justifies the public 
policy of a tax-exempt status; secondly, nonprofits are removed from the 
day to day sway of political influence better enabling them to meet the 
challenge of their charitable mission; thirdly, nonprofits are distinguished 
from business entities because their mission is to stakeholders, not profits 
for shareholders; and lastly, they must adhere to Leonard Bacon’s historic 
                                                                                                                           
 
Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 231 n.126 (2006) (“Colonists in 
Massachusetts established the Mayflower compact and only two colonies did not include self-
governance provisions in their formation: New York and Georgia.”). 
33 See Hall, supra note 32, at 5–7 (acknowledging challenges in deciding how to govern); The 
Charter of 1650, Harvard Corporation, http://library.harvard.edu/university-archives/using-the-
collections/online-resources/charter-of-1650. 
34 See Hall, supra note 32, at 5; The Charter of 1650, Harvard Corporation, http://library.harvard 
.edu/university-archives/using-the-collections/online-resources/charter-of-1650. In 1636 Harvard 
College was created as an autonomous self-managing corporation free of control from the 
Massachusetts Colonial Legislature. See also Blodgett et al., supra note 2, at 447 (discussing founding 
of Harvard for public good). 
35 Hall, supra note 32, at 6; The Charter of 1650, Harvard Corporation, http://library.harvard.edu/ 
university-archives/using-the-collections/online-resources/charter-of-1650. 
36 Hall, supra note 32. 
37 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
Id.; see also Hall, supra note 32, at 10 (arguing right to assemble requires that nonprofits operate from 
the people not the government). 
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call for the highest standard of morality to assure continued public support 
for advancement of the nonprofit mission.38 
Such unique characteristics distinguish nonprofits from government 
and for-profit entities and help to explain why the public perceives them 
differently, generally regarding them as possessing a higher ethical standard 
of trust.39 However, this perception belies current nonprofit reality.40 For 
example, their historic standard of fiduciary duty has been diluted and today 
is similar to that of for-profits; yet nonprofits do not receive the same 
scrutiny as for-profits since state regulation is varied and limited.41 
Additionally, it appears that a void exists in state regulation of nonprofit 
mission adherence.42 Furthermore, Congress generally excluded nonprofits 
from the Sarbanes Oxley Act leaving to the states the challenge of 
coordinating a response to this regulatory gap.43 
B. Nonprofit Regulatory Environment 
The federal government regulates tax compliance of nonprofits 
through the IRS. The IRS utilizes the federal taxing power to grant to 
nonprofits a privileged tax-exempt status upon compliance with the tax 
code and its corresponding suggested governance guidelines.44 The IRS 
                                                                                                                           
 
38 Leonard Bacon, Responsibility in the Management of Societies, 5 THE NEW ENGLANDER 28, 
29, 32, 33 (1847). Bacon asserted that the fiduciary duties of nonprofit Boards require both disclosure to 
placate the public and a high moral standard of governance as the guardians of others’ property. Id. See 
also Blodgett et al., supra note 2, at 446 (discussing Bacon’s standard of morality). 
39 Smith & Richmond, supra note 31, at 75 (discussing importance of ethical behavior due to 
nonprofits’ need for public support to survive). 
40 See id. 
41 See id. (noting nonprofits potential desire to operate under corporate governance model to 
remain competitive). 
42 See Table 2a. 
43 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (generally omitting 
nonprofits from consideration); see also Nicole Gilkeson, Note, For-Profit Scandal in the Nonprofit 
World: Should States Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 
831, 844–45 (2007) (noting limited applicability Sarbanes-Oxley has on nonprofit organizations). 
44 I.R.C. § 7801 (2006). See also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012) (outlining organizations receiving 
tax-exempt status). Pursuant to this section, all  
[c]orporations and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but 
only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or 
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which 
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maintains a strong and necessary hand in monitoring the tax compliance of 
nonprofits. For example, in furtherance of its tax compliance, the IRS in 
2006 revised its Form 990 requiring more transparency and disclosure from 
all nonprofits registering for a tax-exempt status.45 Moreover, the IRS 
website identifies its mission consistent with its enabling statute: “[t]he IRS 
role is to help the large majority of compliant taxpayers with the tax law, 
while ensuring that the minority who are unwilling to comply pay their fair 
share.”46 Thus, the IRS appears to have restricted its scope of nonprofit 
authority as one that is limited to tax compliance, not governance.47 
The IRS exercises jurisdiction over tax-exempt organizations through 
the Exempt Organizations Division (EOD).48 However, the EOD’s capacity 
                                                                                                                           
 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the 
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate 
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. 
See id. The nine guidelines of good governance for nonprofits proposed by the IRS are 
(1) Adoption of a Mission Statement, (2) Adoption of a Code of Ethics and Whistleblower 
policies, (3) Satisfaction of the Duty of Care/Director Diligence, (4) Satisfaction of the 
Duty of Loyalty/effective conflicts of interest oversight, (5) Constituent transparency, 
(6) Oversight of fund-raising activity, (7) Stewardship of financial affairs, (8) Payment of 
reasonable compensation; and (9) Adoption of a document retention policy. 
IRS Releases Suggested Governance Guidelines for Tax-Exempt Organizations, MCDERMOTT WILL & 
EMERY (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PublicationDetail&pub  
=6137; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., GOOD GOVERNANCE PRACTICES FOR 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS 
[hereinafter GOOD GOVERNANCE], available at http://www.mwe.com/info/news/IRS0207.pdf. 
45 See 2010 Forms 990 and 990-EZ: Significant Changes, IRS (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.irs 
.gov/Charities-&-Nonprofits/2010-Forms-990-and-990-EZ-Significant-Changes-1 (noting specific 
changes in Form 990, Part VI, regarding governance, management, and disclosure). Several newsworthy 
controversies led to the changes. See, e.g., Adelphi University v. Board of Regents of the State of New 
York, 229 A.D. 2d 36 (1997) (finding high salary of President indicated that Board failed to achieve its 
educational mission and breached fiduciary duties); Karen Donnelly, United Way, Good Governance: 
Has the IRS Usurped the Best Judgment of Tax Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and 
Accountability, 79 UMKC L. REV. 163, 173–74 (2010) (discussing nonprofit scandals including 
Aramony v. United Way involving excessive executive compensation, mismanagement, and misuse of 
organization’s donated funds); Keith Epstein, Case Study: American Red Cross, CONTRIBUTE (2009) 
(discussing Red Cross’s failure to disclose withholding of $200 million from 9/11 donations for 
administrative costs). 
46 Internal Revenue Service Homepage, available at /www.irs.gov/uac/The-Agency,-its-Mission-
and-Statutory-Authority. The IRS was created pursuant to a legislative grant within section 7801 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 7801 (2006). 
47 See id. 
48 Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 670 
(2007). 
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to monitor the complexities of charitable nonprofit mission adherence is 
often diminished through other agency objectives that deviate from its own 
tax compliance authority.49 The EOD has only 400 agents with a budget of 
$62 million and supervises close to 1.2 million nonprofits.50 In contrast, the 
Securities Exchange Commission has a budget of $300 million with less 
than 14,000 publicly traded companies to supervise.51 Consequently, the 
director of the EOD has noted that its lack of resources require a self-
regulating governance model that precludes the IRS from monitoring 
nonprofit mission.52 Currently, analyzing nonprofit mission adherence is 
largely a subjective challenge of qualitative and equitable determination.53 
Such analysis is contrary to the IRS’s statutory authority of restrictive 
powers illustrating poignantly that nonprofit mission is to stakeholders a 
quality far more difficult to measure than shareholder profits.54 The recent 
IRS scandal in which officials targeted conservative 501(c)(4) groups 
provides an apt example of the consequences when the IRS deviates from 
its stated mission and restrictive powers.55 
The states inherited our colonial tradition of primary responsibility to 
regulate nonprofits which are legally formed through filing state Articles of 
Incorporation.56 This state regulation is carried out through State Attorneys 
General who oversee and supervise nonprofits and enforce the Board and 
Officer fiduciary duties to the organization.57 For example, if a nonprofit 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 Id. 
50 Peters Swords, Tax Exempt Charitable Organizations (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, 
Dec. 1996). 
51 Id. 
52 Shannon McGhee Hernandez, Conversions of Nonprofit Hospitals to For Profit Status: The 
Tennessee Experience, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 1077 n.85, 1133 (1998); see also Jill R. Horwitz, Why We 
Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1345, 1385–86 (2003). 
53 Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What is the I.R.S. Role in Charity 
Governance?, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 543 (1999); Evelyn Brody, Book Review: The Twilight of 
Organizational Form of Charity: Musings on Norman Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom: The 
Emergence of the Modern Nonprofit Sector, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1268 (2002). 
54 Id. 
55 Nicholas Confessore, Uneven I.R.S. Scrutiny Seen in Political Spending by Big Tax-Exempt 
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2013; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
56 See supra note 21 (listing state attorneys generals’ websites); see also Table 1. 
57 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5000 et seq. (West 2013) (providing extensive statutory guidance for 
nonprofit organizations); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180 § 1 et seq. (2013) (listing sections governing 
nonprofit organizations). 
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leader breaches his fiduciary duty, the Attorney General may coordinate the 
appointment of new fiduciaries.58 Additionally, State Attorneys General 
regulate a variety of business forms and governance initiatives that dovetail 
with the IRS tax compliance function.59 The IRS could therefore play a 
coordinating role with the state attorneys general to ensure that their 
respective interests are properly aligned.60 
The State Attorneys General are the public face of nonprofits and are 
responsible for consumer protection of donor contributions and oversight of 
nonprofits’ assets.61 However, the traditional role of State Attorneys 
General exceeds mere responsibility for nonprofit oversight; it is the most 
visible and influential state office protecting consumers and fighting 
crime.62 Yet, individual state Attorneys General have competing agendas 
and interests and they must prioritize their activities utilizing scarce 
resources as reflected in inadequate staffing and budget allocations.63 Their 
National Association may be a forum for leveraging resources to address 
the challenge of mission adherence.64 
                                                                                                                           
 
58 Brody, supra note 53, at 544. 
59 John Tyler, Symposium: Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in 
Social Entrepreneurship: Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for 
L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 150–51 (2010). 
60 Brody, supra note 53, at 591 n.29. 
61 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180 § 1 et seq. (2013) (listing sections governing nonprofit 
organizations); Press Release, Mass. Att’y Gen. Office, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha 
Coakley Announces Enhanced Oversight of Nonprofit Executive and Board Compensation (Sept. 2, 
2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2009/ag-coakley-
announces-enhanced-oversight-of.html; Christine McConville, Pols Aim to Ban Money for Nonprofit 
Boards, BOSTON HERALD (May 23, 2011), http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_politics/ 
2011/05/pols_aim_ban_money_nonprofits%E2%80%99_Boards. 
62 See generally authors comments, LYNN M. ROSS, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POWERS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES (1990). 
63 See Alicia M. Maples, State Attorney General Oversight of Nonprofit Healthcare 
Corporations: Have We Reached an Ideological Impasse?, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 235, 240 (2007) (noting 
differing opinions regarding attorney general’s duties to nonprofits). The author specifically highlights 
scholars’ arguments that attorneys general “lack the ‘[r]esources or expertise to engage in the detailed 
assessments of the business and health policy issues surrounding the appropriate deployment of 
charitable assets that such decisions implicate.’” Id.; see also Lumen M. Mulligan, What Good for the 
Goose is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 
1990, n.70 (2007) (“State attorneys general have historically given limited resources, and a low priority, 
to nonprofit enforcement”). 
64 National Association of Attorneys General homepage, available at www.naag.org. 
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Limited state resources can impact nonprofit supervision and 
oversight.65 For example, only six (50%) of State Attorneys General offices 
in the 12-state sample have a Public Charities or Nonprofit Division to 
enforce their nonprofit laws.66 Furthermore, resource support for Nonprofit 
Charities Divisions vary from state to state.67 For example, New York with 
62,598 public charitable nonprofits has 14 attorneys in its charities division; 
Massachusetts with 22,885 public charitable nonprofits has 6.68 Those with 
no attorneys in their charities division are Florida with 51,419 public 
charitable nonprofits, Michigan with 29,670 public charitable nonprofits, 
and Virginia with 26,580 public charitable nonprofits.69 Consequently, the 
number of attorneys assigned to the Charities Division or lack thereof may 
suggest inadequate staffing resources limiting the ability of the State 
Attorneys General to effectively fill in the nonprofit regulatory gap. 
However, in the 12-state sample, a number of State Attorneys General 
are carrying on a more pro-active effort to prevent financial abuses by 
drafting legislative proposals to provide reforms of financial integrity for 
nonprofits.70 For example, one state in the sample, California, has enacted 
these financial reforms into law, the California Integrity Act.71 Other states 
in the sample such as New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 
have offered initiatives along the same line.72 From these proactive 
                                                                                                                           
 
65 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (referencing lack of resources allocated to state 
attorneys generals for oversight of nonprofits). 
66 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting states with specific charity/nonprofit division 
within attorney general’s office). 
67 See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
68 Boris et al., supra note 3. 
69 Id. 
70 See Jamieson Baker, Nonprofits, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the States, GUIDESTAR (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.guidestar.org/rxa/news/articles/2005/nonprofits-sarbanes-oxley-and-the-states.aspx?articleId 
=779 (noting states’ attempts to pass legislation due to major corporate scandals). See also Blodgett et 
al., supra note 2, at 458 (discussing proposed Massachusetts legislation to limit nonprofit Board 
compensation). 
71 See California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, 2004 Cal. Stat. 919 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE and CAL. GOV’T CODE); see also Gilkeson, supra note 
43, at 834 (discussing California Act and its similarity to Sarbanes-Oxley regarding “independent audits 
and audit committees”). 
72 See Baker, supra note 70 (discussing briefly states’ proposed legislation following major 
corporate scandals); see also Tom Reilly, Office of Massachusetts Attorney General, An Act to Promote 
the Financial Integrity of Public Charities, http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Building%20Strong% 
20Ethical%20Foundations/Mass_AG.Act_to_promote_fin_integ_pub_charities.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 
2013). 
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initiatives State Attorneys General appear to prioritize nonprofit financial 
integrity as the number one issue. Mission adherence is not included in 
these legislative initiatives; hence a multi-dimensional standard of 
governance remains elusive. 
In the 12-state sample, all but one Attorneys General are elected, a 
political reality which imposes certain considerations in carrying out their 
supervisory, oversight and enforcement duties.73 Elected State Attorneys 
General are first and foremost responsible to electoral politics, facing 
periodic reelection campaigns which require prioritizing issues that appeal 
to voters and the media.74 Consequently, our electoral process may 
encourage a public perception of strong state government nonprofit 
leadership; however, in reality the focus of State Attorneys General remains 
almost exclusively on donor and nonprofit asset protection, financial fraud 
and abuse.75 State Attorneys General must lead the way in a collaborative 
effort with other nonprofit leadership to articulate a multi-dimensional 
standard of governance.76 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Mission Adherence 
Overall, this article proposes a multi-dimensional standard for 
nonprofit governance that includes: 1) mission adherence; 2) fiduciary 
leadership; and 3) financial integrity. All three must work in tandem to be 
most effective and they must be tailored to the nonprofit sector, not mere 
juxtapositions of for-profit concepts and practices.77 Likewise, each 
dimension requires an ethical focus since nonprofits are deeply rooted in 
ethics; they benefit the public and are dependent on public trust. 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 See National Association, supra note 64, at www.naag.org/current-attorneys-gen.php (listing 
current Attorneys General as elected and appointed). New Jersey is the only state in the sample where 
the Attorney General is not elected. Id. 
74 ROSS, supra note 62. It creates smart political perception and makes attention-grabbing 
headlines when State Attorneys General pursue various forms of financial malfeasance and conflicts of 
interest. Id. 
75 See supra notes 61 and 63 and accompanying text. 
76 Id. 
77 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 477–78. 
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The first important dimension for nonprofit governance is mission 
adherence which embodies the organization’s values, purpose and goals.78 
Beyond mere statements of charitable purpose, mission statements have an 
important and unique role in nonprofits.79 These inspirational statements 
comprise organizational values, purposes, and goals.80 More importantly, 
they empower employees to act, clarify objectives and set an ethical tone.81 
Peter Drucker suggests that organizations are not defined by name, 
statutes, or articles of incorporation; rather they are defined by business 
mission.82 Likewise, nonprofits must be vigilant in adhering to their unique 
charitable mission. Philosophical and operational commitment to the 
accomplishment of mission begins at the top level.83 That commitment 
determines the shared vision to which everyone in the organization 
adheres.84 Nonprofits can build a culture that advances mission adherence 
within a multi-dimensional standard of governance.85 “A clearly articulated 
mission statement adopted by the Board of Directors serves to explain and 
popularize the charity’s purpose and guide its work,” and it also addresses 
“why the charity exists, what it hopes to accomplish, and what activities it 
will undertake, where and for whom.”86 The charitable mission justifies the 
public policy of granting nonprofits a tax-exempt status.87 Therefore, the 
IRS has issued suggested guidelines for good governance practices.88 
However, these guidelines are not an assertion of nonprofit governance 
leadership; rather, they were created to enhance tax compliance. Thus 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Ireland, supra note 15, generally see also 
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (discussing 
attorney general’s role as parens patriae where nonprofit has no shareholders). 
79 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 477–78. 
80 See Ireland & Hitt, supra note 15, at 34 (acknowledging importance of strong mission 
statement). 
81 See id. at 35. 
82 See generally at pp. 89–90 Peter F. Drucker, What Business Can Learn from Nonprofits, 67(5) 
HARV. BUS. REV. 88 (1989). 
83 See Ireland & Hitt, supra note 15, at 34. 
84 See id. 
85 See Governance and Related Topics–501(c)(3) Organizations, I.R.S. (Feb. 4. 2008), http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_practices.pdf. 
86 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 474. 
87 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
88 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
2013] STATE OVERSIGHT OF NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE 95 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.59 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
nonprofit governance including mission adherence remains the state’s 
responsibility consistent with our colonial tradition.89 
Yet, none of the State Attorneys General in the 12-state sample 
appears to enforce mission adherence.90 The legal formation requirement of 
a “statement of charitable purpose” as required by state Articles of 
Incorporation does not alone constitute state nonprofit best practices.91 A 
narrow statement of charitable purpose is merely a starting point. This is 
not a mission statement, and often it lacks the holistic expression of values, 
purpose and goals necessary for nonprofit mission adherence. Consistent 
adherence to the nonprofit mission throughout its existence promotes state 
best practices for nonprofits. Furthermore, congressional action culminating 
in two recent Panel reports on nonprofit leadership initiatives correctly 
recognized a regulatory gap where limited Federal or IRS oversight ends 
and state regulation must begin. State leadership of nonprofits is consistent 
with their legal formation, the authority of the State Attorneys General, and 
our colonial heritage; states must place more emphasis on mission 
adherence within a multi-dimensional standard of governance. 
B. Fiduciary Leadership 
Board of Directors and principal officers of nonprofits must adhere to 
a high standard of trust in the governance of the organizations they lead.92 
This standard of trust or fiduciary duty includes: a duty of care and good 
faith, whereby conflicts of interest are to be avoided; diligence and 
attention, requiring attendance and active participation at Board meetings; 
                                                                                                                           
 
89 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
90 See Table 2a. 
91 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 474; see also Jon Austin, Good Governance Practices & 501(c)(3) 
Organizations, McAlister & McAlister Law Firm (2012), available at http://www.mmmtlaw.com/ 
articles/IRSGoodGovernance.asp (noting importance of mission statements). 
92 See Beard v. Achenbach Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 170 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir. 1948) (upholding 
Directors’ decisions as long as they are made “honestly and in good faith”). The court discussed that 
simply because Directors make a bad judgment call, they may still not have violated their duty so long 
as they are not “so reckless or extravagant as to amount to bad faith or gross or willful negligence on the 
part of Directors in the discharge of their duties.” Id.; see also Attorney Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 
N.E.2d 1011, 1020–21 (Mass. 1985) (addressing breach of director’s fiduciary leadership); Adelphi 
Univ. v. Bd. of Regents of the State of N.Y., 652 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (discussing 
appropriateness of removing trustees for misconduct, incapacity, neglect of duty”). 
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and a level of skill that requires reasonable care.93 Often forgotten but 
critical in the nonprofit context, fiduciary duty also requires a duty of 
obedience that assures commitment and adherence to mission and a duty of 
loyalty which requires avoidance of personal gain and conflict of interest.94 
Thus, the ethical underpinnings of fiduciary leadership are care, 
loyalty, and obedience.95 The preservation of these ethical values is the 
responsibility of the nonprofit Board of Directors.96 A nonprofit Board 
fulfills its fiduciary leadership through effective governance of the 
organization’s mission and resources.97 This fiduciary responsibility is 
based on trust requiring the fiduciary to act unselfishly by providing the 
organization with the benefit of his or her knowledge and skill, and by 
always keeping a nonprofit’s interests paramount.98 Thus the standard of 
performance for Board nonprofit governance is necessarily high and 
operates within the context of trust.99 Such fiduciary leadership must begin 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 See Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43 (2008); 
see also Gary R. Pannone, Board Governance and the Nonprofit Organization, PANNONE LOPES 
DEVEREAUX & WEST LLC, http://www.pldw.com/Knowledge-and-Resource-Center/PLDW-Board-
Governance.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (defining nonprofit Board management structure and 
responsibilities); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-6-22 (2012) (outlining the duties of the Board of Directors); see 
also Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999). 
94 See Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1999) (acknowledging nonprofit Directors duty to adhere to organization’s purposes and goals); see also 
Atkinson, supra note 93; Margaret E. McLean, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate 
Takeovers: Restraints on the Use of ESOPS by Corporate Officers and Directors to Avert Hostile 
Takeovers, 10 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 761 (1983). Disclosed conflicts of interest and other self-serving acts 
may be acceptable under both the nonprofit best judgment rule and the for profit business judgment rule 
if not contrary to the best interests of the corporation see also Hall, supra note 32, at 22. 
95 See Pannone, supra note 93 (defining nonprofit Board management structure and 
responsibilities); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-6-22 (2012) (stating Board of director responsibilities); see also 
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999). See generally Pamela 
C. Smith, Kerry McTier & Kelly R. Pope, Nonprofit Employees’ Machiavellian Propensities, 25 FIN. 
ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT. 335 (2009) (asserting that preservation of nonprofit mission can be 
achieved through appropriate attention to disclosure, financial management and the public good) at 336–
38 and 347–50 generally. 
96 Mark S. Schwartz, Thomas W. Dunfee & Mark J. Kline, Tone at the Top: An Ethics Code for 
Directors?, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 79 (2005). 
97 See Harry J. Friedman & Tracy Green Landauer, How to be a Responsible Nonprofit Director: 
Do’s and Don’ts—Avoiding Punishment for Good Deeds, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP (2005), http:// 
www2.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2005/1102.pdf. 
98 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “fiduciary”). 
99 See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (discussing high level of trust owed by 
Directors). 
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at the top of the organization where fiduciary duty and other ethical values 
are communicated first at the highest level and then fully implemented 
throughout the organization by training in the appropriate policies.100 
The states within the sample are following a less rigorous fiduciary 
standard by following the 1987 revised Model Nonstock Corporation 
Statute.101 It permits charitable nonprofits to follow the Best Judgment 
Rule, a flexible and lenient fiduciary standard.102 It generally mirrors the 
fiduciary standard required for business corporations under the Business 
Judgment Rule.103 The Best Judgment Rule dilutes the previously more 
rigorous standard for nonprofits, called the Prudent Man Rule, which 
“strictly prohibited self-dealing and conflicts of interest.”104 It was based on 
the historic ethical foundation of nonprofits as articulated by Leonard 
Bacon who set the ethical and moral tone for nonprofit associations to 
receive continued public support.105 He noted that nonprofit governance 
must reflect trust in a higher sense of ethics and morality to assure public 
support “as a security against mismanagement and gradual perversion of the 
trust.”106 
Consequently, under the current Best Judgment Rule, such transactions 
as self-dealing and conflicts of interest are permitted as long as a “fully 
informed” Board acts in a way that is not manifestly “contrary to the 
nonprofit’s best interests.”107 However, these lower standards of fiduciary 
responsibility coupled with public revelations of nonprofit malfeasance 
                                                                                                                           
 
100 See Smith et al., supra note 95, at 335; Schwartz et al., supra note 96. 
101 See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.02, 8.12, 8.30–8.33 (1987) (amended 2008). 
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act is an ABA-sponsored model statute for uniform 
nonprofit governance that states may adopt. See id. §§ 1.01, 1.02; Jeremy Benjamin, Note, 
Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1677, 1694 (2009) 
(noting similarity between the two rules). 
102 Id. 
103 McLean, supra note 94, at 761. Disclosed conflicts of interest and other self-serving acts may 
be acceptable under both the nonprofit best judgment rule and the for profit business judgment rule if 
not contrary to the best interests of the corporation. See also Hall, supra note 32, at 22. 
104 See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830); see also Hall, supra note 32, see 
generally Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830) (applying Prudent Man Rule which exonerated 
diminished estate’s trustees of any mismanagement). This act abandoned the Prudent Man standard. 
Rev. Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.30 cmt. 
105 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
106 Bacon, supra note 38, at 28–32. 
107 See also Hall, supra note 32, at 22, www.Boardsource.org/dl.asp?document_id=11 (2003). 
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have raised serious concerns about Board commitment to the “exercise of 
wisdom and ethical conduct in fulfilling its fiduciary duties.”108 These 
nonprofit concerns are poignant reminders of well-publicized corporate for-
profit malfeasance where similar disclosed acts met with BOD approval.109 
While Congress enacted the Sarbanes Oxley Act as a way of 
promoting fiduciary duty of for-profits, such governance standards 
promoting financial accountability can also enhance fiduciary duty of 
nonprofits.110 Consistent with the limited scope of federal regulation of 
nonprofits described supra, Congress has urged the states to articulate a 
nonprofit governance initiative for better “accountability, disclosure, and 
transparency.”111 Perhaps it is most important that nonprofits cultivate “a 
culture of financial understanding,” rather than expanding this financial 
                                                                                                                           
 
108 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Ray Bauschke, A Director’s Duty Is to Act 
Prudently, CREDIT UNION TIMES (May 3, 2010), http://www.cutimes.com/2010/03/03/a-
DirectorsDirectorsDirectorsDirectorsDirectorsDirectorsDirectorsDirectors-duty-is-to-act-prudently. See 
REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT Official Comment to Section 8.12 (1987) (asserting that when 
setting Board compensation, compliance is necessary with sections 8.30–8.33 that include the fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and due care). In contrast with for-profits, the Congress has taken no affirmative action 
on revelations of nonprofit fiduciary breaches such as excessive executive compensation exemplified by 
United Way and Adelphi University, or of violation of mission adherence through Board profit-making 
schemes and conflicts of interests as exposed in Phoebe-Putney Memorial Hospital. See supra note 45 
and accompanying text. 
109 See In re Enron Corp. Securities Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, 529 F. Supp. 2d 644 (S.D. 
Tex. 2006); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. Well-known and 
egregious scandals such as Enron and World-Com in the for-profit sector have resulted in enhanced 
Federal scrutiny and reform efforts culminating in Congress’ enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. Its purpose is to strengthen the 
standard of fiduciary duty by improving corporate governance, financial controls and audits for business 
corporations. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (“An Act to protect 
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the 
securities laws, and for other purposes”). Although Congress generally excluded them from SOX, many 
advocate that nonprofits should fall under or comply with the principles of SOX; albeit this challenge 
may be limited to nonprofits in the largest asset class. See Mark S. Blodgett & Linda J. Melconian, 
Health-care Nonprofits: Enhancing Governance and Public Trust, 117:2 BUS. & SOCIETY REV. 210–12 
(2012); Gilkeson, supra note 43, at 832 (referencing United Way scandals). 
110 Id. 
111 Strengthening Transparency, Governance, Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A 
Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector, PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 9, http:// 
www.indepdentsector.org/uploads/Accountability_Documents/Panel_Final_Report.pdf (June 2005). 
Two nonprofit reports to Congress confirm urgency of nonprofit reforms and lack of Congressional 
oversight. Id. Blodgett & Melconian, supra note 109, at 197–219. “Lack of transparency in their 
regulation of charities makes it impossible to assess whether regulators truly improve charity 
governance . . . .” BRODY, supra note 9, at 480. 
2013] STATE OVERSIGHT OF NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE 99 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.59 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
regulation to include nonprofits.112 Congressional reluctance to extend the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to nonprofits may have been intended to send a strong 
message of urgency to the states to legislate such governance and financial 
principles. The quest for nonprofit financial integrity does not require 
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; rather, it requires an ethical focus 
on similar and complementary principles and values as they relate to 
governing the culture of nonprofit financial integrity. 
C. Financial Integrity 
States are taking numerous approaches to nonprofit financial integrity. 
Several Attorneys General in the 12-state sample focus on financial 
transparency that requires financial disclosure and audit committees.113 
Another approach is to increase external State Attorneys General oversight 
of accounting disclosure provisions including independent CPA audits, 
officer certification of financial statements, and Board executive 
compensation approval.114 Eleven of the State Attorneys General offices 
provide consumer donor protection. For example, California’s Attorney 
General requires registration and financial reporting for all charitable 
solicitation.115 However, Texas is the only state in the sample where this 
office fails to protect donors as consumers.116 “Donors generally do not 
expect to receive benefits from their donations, but they do anticipate their 
funds will be used to support the mission [adherence] of the 
organization.”117 
                                                                                                                           
 
112 See Jane Crawford, Profiling the Nonprofit Leader of Tomorrow, IVEY BUS. J. 4, 
http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/leadership/profiling-the-nonprofit-leader-of-tomorrow 
#.UUsvBlvSNH0 (2010). 
113 See Table 2b. 
114 See State Departments of Justice, supra note 20; see also Blodgett, supra note 2, at 465–66 
(discussing State Attorneys General initiatives). 
115 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.402 (West 2010); §§ 496.404(20), 496.406, 496.409, 496.410, 
496.411. See State Departments of Justice, supra note 20. 
116 See Charities and Nonprofits, supra note 21. Texas requires registration and reporting of 
professional solicitors only. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 22. Most states mirror the language of 
Florida’s Statute by clearly stating that the intent of the state legislature is to “protect the public by 
reviewing full public disclosure of the identity of persons who solicit contributions from the public.” 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 496.402 (West 2010). 
117 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 193. 
100 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32:81 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.59 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
California is the model for financial integrity through the California 
Integrity Act.118 This leading state response provides “oversight of 
fundraising activity, stewardship of financial affairs, and payment of 
reasonable compensation.”119 More specifically, it requires nonprofit 
corporations with gross revenues of $2 million or more to file financial 
reports with the State’s Attorney General.120 Additionally, it requires 
Boards of nonprofits with annual revenues over $500,000: 
1. “To engage an independent CPA to perform an audit according to 
GAAP accounting principles;” 
2. “to submit audit inspection by the Attorney General and the 
public for three years;” 
3. “to appoint an audit committee, with a detailed outline of 
responsibilities”121 
Other states in the sample, New York, Massachusetts, Ohio and 
Pennsylvania, have proposed legislation mirroring the financial focus of 
California’s Integrity Act.122 Certainly, the California law and these other 
state proposals embrace good state best practices that promote financial 
integrity. However, notwithstanding these lofty financial initiatives that also 
support fiduciary leadership, none will satisfy the proposed multi-
dimensional standard of governance absent a holistic approach that 
considers mission adherence.123 
                                                                                                                           
 
118 CAL. GOV. CODE ANN. § 12586 (West 2005). 
119 CAL. GOV. CODE ANN. § 12586 (West 2005). 
120 CAL. GOV. CODE ANN. § 12586 (West 2005). Furthermore, no uniformity exists from state to 
state on the gross revenue threshold requirements for filing an audited financial statement. The range is 
$200,000 to $2 million. See State Departments of Justice, supra note 20. 
121 CAL. GOV. CODE ANN. § 12586 (West 2005) (mirroring fiduciary principles of SOX). 
122 Michael Klausner & Jonathan Small, Failing to Govern? The Disconnect Between Theory and 
Reality in Nonprofit Boards, and How to Fix It, STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION REV. (2005), 
www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/198/cirm/KlausnerNov08.pdf. These proposals would impose a duty on the 
Board to exercise financial oversight: (1) requiring CEO and CFO certification of accuracy and 
completeness of financial statements; (2) mandating public reporting of financial results to maintain 
appropriate financial controls; and (3) requiring Board disclosure to auditors and audit committee of 
deficiencies, weaknesses or fraud in these controls. Id. 
123 See Tables 2a and 2b. 
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D. Recommendations 
Legislative reforms that address fiduciary leadership and financial 
integrity are important but they do not encompass a holistic approach to 
nonprofit governance.124 “The need for mission and organizational 
accountability is based on subtler arguments than financial accountability, 
but it is no less powerful.”125 Legislative initiatives concerning nonprofit 
governance require a multi-dimensional standard with more focus on 
mission adherence and corresponding values, purpose, and goals. Such a 
mission statement clarifies an ethical focus in each dimension: 
uncompromising loyalty to mission, accountability in fiduciary leadership, 
and creation of a culture of financial integrity. State oversight of nonprofit 
governance confronts the challenge of mission adherence through 
collaborative efforts of the National Association and the nonprofit 
leadership including the National Council of Nonprofits to write a self-
policing, multi-dimensional “Nonprofit State Best Practices.” 
This article first recommends the establishment of a task force within 
the National Association to develop mission adherence criteria for inclusion 
in the nonprofit state best practices. The State Attorneys General within the 
sample, which represents over one half million nonprofits and their 
numerous stakeholders, could spearhead this effort. The criteria would 
permit the State Attorneys General to measure the ongoing achievement of 
mission by reviewing the achievement of values, purpose, and goals. For 
example, a nonprofit may establish the goal of serving a threshold number 
of clients within a targeted population. A nonprofit that feeds the homeless 
might include a target of increasing the population served by five percent 
annually; that target could represent a measurable criteria. 
Second, this article recommends that State Attorneys General require 
nonprofits to submit a one-time comprehensive mission statement of values, 
purpose and goals and that they annually submit a descriptive narrative of 
mission adherence. In the above example where a nonprofit feeds the poor, 
the nonprofit’s narrative would describe how it has satisfied or failed to 
satisfy the five percent target. The appropriate State Attorneys General 
                                                                                                                           
 
124 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive 
Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2004). 
125 Id. 
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Office would then apply the aforementioned criteria to the annual reports, 
flagging those that fail in two respects; (1) failing to comply with the 
reporting altogether; or (2) failing to satisfy the State Attorneys General 
qualitative assessment mechanism by not explaining its success or lack 
thereof in meeting its target of mission adherence. Flagged nonprofits could 
then be forwarded to the IRS for tax compliance analysis to further the 
IRS’s regulatory mandate. 
Third, reflecting statewide absence of mission as outlined in Table 2a, 
this article recommends that each State Attorney General office publish on 
its respective website a narrative on mission adherence. Within the section, 
nonprofits could upload their mission statements and annual narratives to 
match a list of nonprofits maintained by the State Attorneys General’s 
website. The National Association could also provide a descriptive section 
on its website regarding the importance of mission adherence and could 
also provide a link to the appropriate section on each State Attorneys 
General website. These connections are highlighted in Figure 1. This 
transparent approach would allow the stakeholder community, to which 
nonprofits owe the highest moral standard of governance, to fully 
internalize and process mission adherence.126 
                                                                                                                           
 
126 Bacon, supra note 38, at 28–32. 
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State oversight of nonprofit governance must confront the challenge of 
mission adherence within a multi-dimensional standard. Mission adherence, 
often overlooked and unregulated, requires greater attention to ethically and 
holistically govern nonprofits. State best practices that encompass a multi-
dimensional standard for nonprofit governance should include explicit 
guidelines for mission statements comprising values, purpose and goals. 
Reporting of mission adherence should include some qualitative standard of 
measurement reportable to the State Attorneys General office for public 
dissemination and review. This process will ensure the “accountability, 
transparency, and disclosure” consistent with Bacon’s historic call for a 
higher sense of morality. Applying such a multi-dimensional standard of 
governance to nonprofits will sustain their unique position in American 
society. 
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Exhibits: 
Table 1: Public Charitable Non-Profits 













Source: National Center for Charitable Statistics 
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Table 2a: Multi-Dimensional Governance Standards of 
Performance within State Statutes 






California x ݱ ݱ 
Florida x ݱ x 
Illinois x x ݱ 
Massachusetts x ݱ ݱ 
Michigan x x ݱ 
New Jersey x ݱ x 
New York x ݱ ݱ 
North Carolina x ݱ ݱ 
Ohio x ݱ x 
Pennsylvania x ݱ ݱ 
Texas x ݱ ݱ 
Virginia x ݱ x 
 
Table 2b: Multi-Dimensional Governance Standards of 
Performance within State Statutes 
State Fiduciary Leadership Financial Integrity 
California § 12599.6(a) A charity must 
“establish and exercise control” 
over its fundraising activities 
conducted for its benefit, including 
approval of all written contracts 
and agreement. 
§ 12586(e)(1) A $2 Million 
Charity must prepare annual 
financial statements using 
generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
Florida § 617.0830 A director shall 
discharge his or her duties as a 
director, including his or her duties 
as a member of a committee (a) In 
good faith; (b) With the care an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and (c) In a 
manner he or she reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation. 
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State Fiduciary Leadership Financial Integrity 
Illinois  § 109.10(d)(3)(e) The board of 
directors may base a 
determination that a distribution 
may be made under subsection 
(d) either on financial 
statements prepared on the basis 
of accounting practices and 
principles that are reasonable in 
the circumstances or on a fair 
valuation or other method that is 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
Massachusetts § 6C A director, officer or 
incorporator of a corporation shall 
perform his duties as such, 
including, in the case of a director, 
his duties as a member of a 
committee of the board upon 
which he may serve, in good faith 
and in a manner he reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation, and with such 
care as an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position. 
§ 6C The auditor shall state that 
he has examined the statement 
of assets and liabilities included 
in such certificate, that his 
examination was made in 
accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards, and 
that in his opinion said 
statement of assets and 
liabilities presents fairly the 
financial position of the 
corporation as of the date 
thereof, in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
Michigan  § 450.2105(3) Properties and 
rights entered upon the books of 
a corporation in accordance 
with generally accepted 
accounting principles, or the 
current fair market value of such 
properties and rights. 
New Jersey § 15A:6-14 Trustees and members 
of any committee designated by 
the board shall discharge their 
duties in good faith and with that 
degree of diligence, care and skill 
which ordinary, prudent persons 
would exercise under similar 
circumstances in like positions. 
 
New York § 521 Failure of the corporation to 
comply in good faith with the 
notice or disclosure or reporting 
provisions of section 501 . . . shall 
§ 719 All financial transactions 
shall be ordered in conformity 
with generally accepted 
accounting principles or other 
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State Fiduciary Leadership Financial Integrity 
make the corporation liable for any 
damage sustained by any person in 
consequence thereof. 
applicable criteria in a manner 
to maintain instability for assets. 
The recorded accountability for 
assets shall be compared with 
the existing assets at reasonable 
intervals and appropriate action 
shall be taken with respect to 
any differences. 
North Carolina § 55A-8-30 A director shall 
discharge his or her duties as a 
director, including his or her duties 
as a member of a committee (a) In 
good faith; (b) With the care an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and (c) In a 
manner he or she reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation. 
§ 55A-16-20 If financial 
statements are prepared for the 
corporation on the basis of 
generally accepted accounting 
principles, the annual financial 
statements shall also be 
prepared on that basis. 
Ohio § 1702.30 A director shall perform 
the duties of a director, including 
the duties as a member of any 
committee of the directors upon 
which the director may serve, in 
good faith, in a manner the 
director reasonably believes to be 
in or not opposed to the best 
interests of the corporation, and 
with the care that an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position 
would use under similar 
circumstances. A committee of the 
directors upon which the director 
does not serve, duly established in 
accordance with a provision of the 
articles or the regulations, as to 
matters within its designated 
authority, which committee the 
director reasonably believes to 
merit confidence. 
 
Pennsylvania(1) § 5712 A director of a nonprofit 
corporation shall stand in a 
fiduciary relation to the 
corporation and shall perform his 
duties as a director, including his 
§ 5701 All financial transactions 
shall be ordered in conformity 
with generally accepted 
accounting principles or other 
applicable criteria in a manner 
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State Fiduciary Leadership Financial Integrity 
duties as a member of any 
committee of the board upon 
which he may serve in good 
faith . . . . 
to maintain instability for assets. 
Texas § 22.226 A director shall discharge 
the director’s duties, including 
duties as a committee member, in 
good faith, with ordinary care, and 
in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the 
best interest of the corporation. 
§ 22.352 A corporation shall 
maintain current and accurate 
financial records with complete 
entries as to each financial 
transaction of the corporation, 
including income and 
expenditures, in accordance 
with generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
Virginia § 13.1-870 A director shall 
discharge his duties as a director, 
including his duties as a member 
of a committee, in accordance with 
is good faith judgment of the best 
interests of the corporation. 
 
Note: 
(1) Pennsylvania was the only state statute to have a subchapter for Fiduciary Duty 
(Chapter 57, Subchapter B, § 5711-15). 
 
